The illegal exploitation of wild abalone in South Africa has been escalating since 1994, despite increased enforcement, leading to collapse in some sections of its range. South Africa banned all wild abalone fishing in 2008 but controversially reopened the fishery in 2010. This paper formulates a poacher’s model, taking into account the realities of the abalone terrain in South Africa – the high-value of abalone, use of recreational drugs, the prevalence of bribery, and corruption – to explore why poaching has not subsided.

This series spans the globe presenting leading research in economics. International applications and examples of economic progress are invaluable in a troubled world with economic booms bursting like so many penny balloons.

The illegal exploitation of wild abalone in South Africa has been escalating since 1994, despite increased enforcement, leading to collapse in some sections of its range. South Africa banned all wild abalone fishing in 2008 but controversially reopened it in 2010.

This paper relates the key findings of the optimal economic enforcement literature to practical issues of enforcing forest and wildlife management access restrictions in developing countries. Our experiences, particularly from Tanzania and eastern India, provide detail of the key pragmatic issues facing those responsible for protecting natural resources.

Many resource users are not involved in formulating and enforcement of resource management regulations in developing countries and do not generally accept such rules. Enforcement officers who have social ties to resource users may encounter social disapproval if they enforce regulations zealously, so they may accept bribes to avoid it.

Many resource users are not involved in formulating and enforcement of resource management regulations in developing countries and do not generally accept such rules.