This chapter provides a case study of the use of choice modelling method in irrigation water supply policy and management in Portugal.
One of the most pressing problems faced by the Tunisian farmers and authorities is the inexorable decline of the water table over the past twenty years due to the over-exploitation of the groundwater. This study is an attempt to find how this issue can be resolved through collective action.
The aim of this working paper is to investigate the optimal regulatory routes from a competition and public interest point of view for the South African water industry.
Colombia's discharge fee system for water effluents is often held up as a model of a well-functioning, economic incentive pollution control program in a developing country. Yet few objective evaluations of the program have appeared.
Namibia is currently in the process of phasing out water subsidies in its government-sponsored irrigation schemes. However, the financial effects on the affected farmers are frequently unclear, and so are the economic effects on society as a whole.
The net back method provides a framework for estimating rough values of irrigation water in situations such as those in Namibian agriculture, where farmers face a number of constraints which are difficult to model explicitly due to the dearth of reliable data.
Reform of the water and sanitation sector is occuring in many countries, and offers the potential to improve services to all. Of particular concern, however, is the sitation of the poor, and reform must be designed so that they recieve increased access to affordable services.
A key issue in this regard is water pricing, which is one of the main variables affecting the distribution of benefits between different stakeholders.
Increasing block tariffs (IBTs), widely used in the developing world, are claimed to produce desirable income transfers, discourage wasteful use, promote economic efficiency, and assure access to sufficient water for basic sanitation. In fact, these claims are either excessive or incorrect. In practice, IBTs are likely to promote inefficiency, inequity, unfairness, net revenue instability, and other negative consequences. An alternative tariff design, a uniform price with rebate (UPR), is presented.
The use of increasing block water tariffs is widespread throughout developing countries. An increasing block tariff (IBT) is a price structure in which a commodity is priced at a low initial rate up to a specified volume of use (block), then at a higher or several increasingly higher rates for additional block used.
The ordinary household municipal water bill in developing countries is often calculated on some sort of IBT structure, and donor organizations and consultants continue to recomend this practice for town and city water systems.
Cooperative management and development of Africa’s international rivers holds real promise for greater sustainability and productivity of the continent’s increasingly scarce water resources and fragile environment. Moreover, the potential benefits of cooperative water resources management can serve as catalysts for broader regional cooperation, economic integration and development—and even conflict prevention. But riparians will pursue joint action only when they expect to receive greater benefits through cooperation than through unilateral action.
This paper presents a typology of international rivers based on asymmetries in economic and political power among riparian states. This typology is then used, along with other factors such as the spatial location of riparians on the river, to explore the question of why some riparians on international rivers have been able to successfully negotiate treaties and others have not. The findings lend support to both economic and political economy explanations of cooperative action on international rivers.