Implementation and management of an ITQ fishery involves significant and costly administrative activities. These activities include formulating and implementing policy rules, monitoring and enforcement to deter illegal behavior, and economic and marine research. In this article we construct a model of a competitive ITQ system to analyze how the distribution of administrative costs between the public and a fishing industry can affect the equilibrium in the quota market, including equilibrium level of administrative costs, and derive results about the optimal distribution of these costs.

All environmental policies involve costs of implementation and management that are distinct from pollution sources’ abatement costs. In practice, regulators and sources usually share these administrative costs. We examine theoretically an optimal policy consisting of an emissions tax and the distribution of administrative costs between the government and regulated sources of pollution. Our focus is on the optimal distribution of administrative costs between polluters and the government and the optimal level of the emissions tax in relation to marginal pollution damage.

We study the effect of a household subsidy to induce the adoption of more efficient and less polluting wood combustion technologies. We compare, through numerical simulations, several subsidy designs with respect to the impact on aggregate emissions, costs, and cost-effectiveness indicators. Two variables that turn out to be important for the performance of a subsidy program are the remaining time that an existing equipment can be used and the access of the households to credit to fund the co-payment of the equipment.

As an international metropolitan area undergoing rapid development, Beijing is facing a sharp rise in the volume of motor vehicles and mobility, which has become the major contributor to the air pollution in this city.

This book is a remarkable case study of an environmental policy initiative for a national environmental regulatory system in the information age. In 1995 the Indonesian Ministry of Environment took the bold step to launch an environmental disclosure initiative called the Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation and Rating (PROPER). Under PROPER, environmental performance of companies is mapped into a five-color grading scale – Gold for excellent, Green for very good, Blue for good, Red for non-compliance, and Black for causing environmental damage.

Eco-certification can generate private benefits for tourism operators in developing countries and therefore has the potential to improve their environmental performance.

Costa Rica: National level assessment of the role of economic instruments in the conservation policymix

POLICYMIX aims to contribute to achieving the EUs goals of reversing trends in biodiversity loss beyond 2010 through the use of cost-effective and incentive-compatible economic instruments. POLICYMIX focuses on the role of economic instruments in a mix of operational conservation policy instruments. The project includes seven case studies from six countries: Norway, Germany, Portugal, Finland, Brazil (Mato Grosso and Mata Atlantica) and Costa Rica.

To address simultaneity and the presence of spatially correlated unobservables, we measure for neighbors' deforestation using the slopes of neighbors' and neighbors' neighbors' parcels.

This Brief presents a framework that can be used to assess the potential impact of Payments for Environmental Services (PES) schemes.

Factors that determines the impact of PES are discussed such as additional forest conservation through targeted payments and the risk for unintended incentives and consequences and feelings of injustice among those who don´t receive payments. The brief further discuss the role for PES in national REDD+ policy.

How does uncertainty about “dangerous” climate change affect the prospects for international cooperation? Climate negotiations usually are depicted as a prisoners’ dilemma game; collectively, countries are better off reducing their emissions, but self-interest impels them to keep on emitting. We provide experimental evidence, grounded in an analytical framework, showing that the fear of crossing a dangerous threshold can turn climate negotiations into a coordination game, making collective action to avoid a dangerous threshold virtually assured.