To trade or Not to Trade: A Firm-Level Analysis of Emissions Trading in Santiago, Chile

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The authors surveyed firms participating in emissions trading programs in Santiago, Chile, to explore further whether tradable permits are appropriate for transition and developing economies. Their survey information revealed serious implementation and design flaws in Chile’s trading, but they are not more severe than the EU or U.S. systems. Countries with similar income levels and institutional maturity as Chile should be able to develop well-functioning permit trading schemes.

 

Policy Design

Climate Change in a Public Goods Game: Investment Decision in Mitigation versus Adaptation

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The authors studied the potential tradeoff between countries’ investments in mitigation versus adaptation to climate change. Mitigating greenhouse gases may be a public good, but adaptation to climate change is a private good, benefiting only the country or individual.

Experiments, Climate Change

Taxes, Permits, and the Adoption of Abatement Technology under Imperfect Compliance

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The authors analyze how price-based and quantity-based emissions regulations affect compliance incentives and social welfare with incomplete enforcement and technology adoption.

Policy Design

Social Background, Cooperative Behavior, and Norm Enforcement

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Studies have shown differences in cooperative behavior across countries and in the use of (and reaction to) a norm enforcement mechanism in cross-cultural studies.

 

The authors present data that prove that stark differences in both dimensions can exist even within the same town. They created a unique data set, based on one-shot public goods experiments in South Africa. Most of the group differences can be explained by variables for social capital and social environment, such as trust or household violence.

Experiments

Enforcement of Exogenous Environmental Regulations, Social Disapproval, and Bribery

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Many resource users are not involved in formulating and enforcement of resource management regulations in developing countries and do not generally accept such rules. Enforcement officers who have social ties to resource users may encounter social disapproval if they enforce regulations zealously, so they may accept bribes to avoid it.

Experiments

Enforcement of Exogenous Environmental Regulations, Social Disapproval, and Bribery

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Many resource users are not involved in formulating and enforcement of resource management regulations in developing countries and do not generally accept such rules.

 

Experiments

Sustainable Development Innovation Brief #7

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"The contribution of sustainable agriculture and land management to sustainable development" - This brief discusses the potential for sustainable agriculture to contribute towards sustainable development with a particular focus on developing countries. It briefly describes different sustainable agricultural practices and the extent of their adoption, identifies constraints to their further adoption, and presents some actions and policy options that could accelerate the widespread adoption of sustainable agricultural practices.

Agriculture