Studies have shown that there are differences in cooperative behavior across countries. Furthermore, differences in the use and the reaction on the introduction of a norm enforcement mechanism have been documented in cross-cultural studies, recently. We present data which prove that stark differences in both dimensions can exist even within the same town. For this end, a unique data set was created, based on public goods experiments conducted in Cape Town, South Africa.

Studies have shown differences in cooperative behavior across countries and in the use of (and reaction to) a norm enforcement mechanism in cross-cultural studies.

The authors present data that prove that stark differences in both dimensions can exist even within the same town. They created a unique data set, based on one-shot public goods experiments in South Africa. Most of the group differences can be explained by variables for social capital and social environment, such as trust or household violence.

The objective of the present paper is to investigate the robustness of the well-known result that pre-set default options determine people’s choices. We do so by conducting a field experiment among environmental economists attending a large international conference on environmental economics.

Public disclosure programs that collect and disseminate information about firms’ environmental performance are increasingly popular in both developed and developing countries. Yet little is known about whether they actually improve environmental performance, particularly in the latter setting.

The ability to provide public goods is essential for economic and social development, yet there is very limited empirical evidence regarding contributions to a real local public good in developing countries. This paper analyzes a field experiment where 200 households in rural Vietnam could make real contributions to an archetypical public good, a bridge.

The paper provides and tests empirically a conditional resource curse theory, postulating that the relative effectiveness of the contenders plays a crucial role in determining whether resources are a curse or a blessing.

The paper shows that unstructured lending from international credit markets can create incentives to loot the country; and an enhanced likelihood of looting causes greater political instability, and diminishes growth.

This book is the final report from the World Bank's SEA pilot program. It presents the findings and recommendations of the evaluation of the Pilot Program which comprised six SEA pilots on sector reforms in Kenya, Malawi, Sierra Leone, West Africa, Bangladesh and China.

This study shows how cod subpopulations may have been eradicated as a consequence of the use of imperfect models for assessing stock assessment, depleting what was formerly a productive sea. The Kattegat and resund (North Sea) were chosen as study objects due to the combination of different exploitation patterns and the possible existence of separate stock units. The scenario was further elaborated by simulating the potential harvest of fishing for different long-run levels of fishing effort as well as stock size.