Empirical analysis of the factors that determine individual compliance with a locally devised set of rules for harvesting and selling marine turtle eggs, as well as for protecting the turtles and their hatchlings. Rules violators receive a monetary penalty, which implies a reduction in the income from sale of eggs. While some individuals do not have income reductions due to infractions, others have reductions of up to 40% of the total income.

In this study, we analyse effort optimisation in common rights-based joint-stock artisanal fisheries when several objectives are pursued by the authorities and the fleets are heterogeneous. The purpose is to discuss policy options available to the authorities and their implications in terms of trade-offs between goals. We apply a multi-objective programming model to the sardine and anchovy artisanal fisheries in central southern Chile. The results suggest that the regulatory system generates inefficient solutions for profit and employment maximisation goals.

The paper discusses the application of Elinor Ostrom’s Social Ecological Systems (SES) framework, using as example a community organization in Costa Rica, which collectively extracts turtle eggs.

In settings in which people rely directly on either forest or marine resources, protecting both the natural resources and livelihoods is challenging. Findings from Tanzania suggest that, where budgets are limited, key factors for a successful combination of livelihood and conservation policies include the strategic location of livelihood projects that target those most dependent on the protected resource rather than those most likely to cooperate with access restrictions.

Namibian hake is the most important fish resource in Namibia. This monograph is a compilation of all the hake data, historic and recent, that has been used to inform stock assessment and management since the late 1970s.

Regulating common-pool resources is welfare enhancing for society but not necessarily for all users who therefore may oppose regulations. We examine the short-term impact of common-pool resource regulations on welfare distribution.