Biodiversity plays a key role in sustaining the functioning of ecosystems and thus in the provision of ecosystem services. A great deal of biodiversity is to be found in private forests, thus the way in which these forests are managed has major implications for biodiversity.

In this paper we analyze the effects of environmental policies on the size distribution of firms. We model a stationary industry where the observed size distribution is a solution to the profit maximization problem of heterogeneous firms that differ in terms of their energy efficiency. We compare the equilibrium size distribution under emission taxes, uniform emission standards, and performance standards. Our results indicate that, unlike emission taxes and performance standards, emission standards introduce regulatory asymmetries favoring small firms.

We introduce a model of strategic environmental policy where two firms compete á la Cournot in a third market under the presence of multiple pollutants. Two types of pollutants are introduced, a local and a transboundary one. The regulator can only control local pollution as transboundary pollution is regulated internationally. The strategic effect present in the original literature is also replicated in this setup.

This policy brief discusses the whether the  preference of Swedish forestry stakeholders is biodiversity or production goals. Healthy and productive forests benefit us all, but what are the priorities of those directly managing Swedish forests? This brief presents a comparison of the preferences of key stakeholders regarding Swedish forest management and biodiversity protection.

States have treaty-based and customary international law-based responsibilities to ensure that greenhouse gas emissions emanating from their territory do not cause transboundary harm. However, those international legal responsibilities conflict with the observed behavior of states, which suggests a general rule of irresponsible treatment of the global commons.

A revised application of Ostrom's (Ostrom, 2007) Social-Ecological System (SES) framework to Hardin's ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, G. (1968), Science, 162(3859): 1243–1248) demonstrates that its institutional structure is more complex than either Hardin or Ostrom had imagined.