All environmental policies involve costs of implementation and management that are distinct from pollution sources’ abatement costs. In practice, regulators and sources usually share these administrative costs. We examine theoretically an optimal policy consisting of an emissions tax and the distribution of administrative costs between the government and regulated sources of pollution. Our focus is on the optimal distribution of administrative costs between polluters and the government and the optimal level of the emissions tax in relation to marginal pollution damage.

We study the effect of a household subsidy to induce the adoption of more efficient and less polluting wood combustion technologies. We compare, through numerical simulations, several subsidy designs with respect to the impact on aggregate emissions, costs, and cost-effectiveness indicators. Two variables that turn out to be important for the performance of a subsidy program are the remaining time that an existing equipment can be used and the access of the households to credit to fund the co-payment of the equipment.

El Departamento de Análisis Sectorial (DAS) de la Subsecretaría de Pesca, Gobierno de Chile, licitó un estudio con el propósito de evaluar, desde un punto de vista socioeconómico, los efectos de la aplicación de medidas de administración sobre la pesquería de peces pequeños pelágicos de la Zona Centro – Sur. Este proyecto fue adjudicado por la Universidad de Concepción.

In this paper we tested if social networks at the origin, measured by religious affiliation, can affect the out-migration decision. For this purpose, we estimated a conditional logit model and a mixed logit model for the decision to migrate to one of 13 destinations, or to stay at the original location. In general, the results were as expected, given theoretical considerations, and were robust to model specification and estimation procedures. Moreover, the results support the hypothesis that religious attachment affects migration decisions.

Illegal hunting is a threat to wildlife conservation. The motivations for poaching and its possible effects are variable and have not been extensively studied. Applying an economic theoretical-conceptual frame, we analyze the different factors that may determine illegal hunting and discuss some policy implications.

In this study, we analyse effort optimisation in common rights-based joint-stock artisanal fisheries when several objectives are pursued by the authorities and the fleets are heterogeneous. The purpose is to discuss policy options available to the authorities and their implications in terms of trade-offs between goals. We apply a multi-objective programming model to the sardine and anchovy artisanal fisheries in central southern Chile. The results suggest that the regulatory system generates inefficient solutions for profit and employment maximisation goals.

We estimated a hazard function for the duration of micro-enterprises after they had been subject to a public seed financing programme in southern Chile.