Using a mathematical programming model, this study estimates the potential biomass supply from crop residues in China at various exogenously-given biomass prices and identified the areas that are likely to produce crop residues. The analysis indicated that China can potentially produce about 153.0-244.2 million dry metric tons of crop residues per year when biomass prices are larger than $90 per metric ton.

The potential effects of a redistributive fishing quota policy on the profits and employment of the artisanal fisher organizations is analyzed within a multi-objective programming model.

We examine the welfare implications of the Tanzanian fisheries boom resulting from Lake Victoria Nile perch exports during 1993–2008. In the literature, there are two opposing views on the effect of fish trade: some argue that fish trade can act as an engine of growth, while others contend that trade in fish negatively affects food security, local economies and incomes of the poor.

We study the effects of different tax schemes used in fisheries management in combination with an individual transferable quota system. We focus on the effects of taxes on equilibrium quota prices and on violations under the assumption that enforcement to induce compliance is imperfect and costly.

Objectives of tradable permit programs are often broader than internalizing an externality and improving economic efficiency. Many programs are designed to accommodate community, cultural, and other non-efficiency goals through restrictions on trading. However, restrictions can decrease economic efficiency gains. We use a policy experiment from the Alaska halibut and sablefish tradable permit program, which includes both restricted and unrestricted permits, to develop one of the few empirical measurements of the costs of meeting non-efficiency goals.

This paper studies the effects of different tax schemes used in fishery management in combination with an Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system. It focuses on the effects of taxes on equilibrium quota prices and violations under the assumption that enforcement to induce compliance is imperfect and costly. The use of taxes is motivated by the regulator’s need to recover costs for enforcement activities.