Abstract: Previous research studies suggest a lower degree of positional concerns among people from poor countries. Yet the evidence is limited and most often builds on the assumption that people's reference groups are the same across all individuals. We conduct a survey experiment in urban Ethiopia that is modified to include multiplicity of reference groups. We estimate positional concerns considering various reference groups to test whether the low positional concerns found in the literature are due to misspecification of the reference groups.

Abstract: Common identity and peer punishment have been identified as crucial means to reduce free riding and promote cooperation in teams. This paper examines the relative importance of these two mechanisms under two income distributions in team cooperation. In a repeated public good experiment, we use different combinations of homogeneous/heterogeneous endowments, strong/weak identity, and absence/presence of peer punishment.

Land conflicts in developing countries are costly both directly and through increased land degradation. An important policy goal is to create respect for borders. This often involves mandatory, expensive interventions. We propose a new policy design, which in theory promotes neighborly relations at low cost. A salient feature is the option to by-pass regulation through consensus. The key idea combines the insight that social preferences transform social dilemmas into coordination problems with the logic of forward induction.

Pro-environmental behavior is the willingness to cooperate and contribute to environmental public goods. A good understanding of why individuals undertake pro-environmental actions is important in order to construct policies that are aligned with preferences and actual behavioral patterns, such as concern for social esteem and reputation.

This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters on issues related to spillover effects of behavioral and policy interventions aimed at reducing negative incentives provided by consumption and production subsidies, and discusses the implications for environmental policy design. The first two chapters investigate spillover effects of a behavioral intervention aimed at incentivizing residential water savings in Colombia.