Forest managers in developing countries enforce extraction restrictions to limit forest degradation. In response, villagers may displace some of their extraction to other forests, which generates “leakage” of degradation.

In settings in which people rely directly on either forest or marine resources, protecting both the natural resources and livelihoods is challenging. Findings from Tanzania suggest that, where budgets are limited, key factors for a successful combination of livelihood and conservation policies include the strategic location of livelihood projects that target those most dependent on the protected resource rather than those most likely to cooperate with access restrictions.

Mapping the distribution of the quantity and value of forest benefits to local communities is useful for forest management, when socio-economic and conservation objectives may need to be traded off.

In this paper, a commentary on Samuelson’s 1976 classic, “The Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society”, Robinson and Albers address the relevance of Samuelson’s paper to tropical forests. Samuelson’s paper focuses on rich country settings where market and governance institutions function well and where forests are managed for timber through rotations.

Patterns of forest cover and forest degradation determine the size and types of ecosystem services forests provide. Particularly in low-income countries, nontimber forest product (NTFP) extraction by rural people, which provides important resources and income to the rural poor, contributes to the level and pattern of forest degradation.

Typically both local villagers (“insiders”) and non-locals (“outsiders”) extract products from protected forests even though the activities are illegal. Our paper suggests that, depending on the relative ecological damage caused by each group, budget-constrained forest managers may be able to reduce total forest degradation by legalizing “insider” extraction in return for local villagers involvement in enforcement activities.