Subsidies are part of the set of management tools that governments apply to modernize their fishing fleets and enable them to engage in offshore and international fisheries. Research has shown that subsidies often lead to overcapacity and overfishing, resulting in the depletion of fish stocks. A few studies, however, have found some positive effects for particular subsidies. In this paper, we investigate a credit-linked subsidy scheme in Vietnam, which seems to be justified on the basis of economic, social, and environmental considerations.

Summary.

Abstract: In this paper, we describe and analyze an experience in the use of marine resources as a base for economic activities and development of coastal communities. According to the economic theory of the commons, Chile’s establishment of unique property and user rights for marine resources should reduce over-extraction pressure from open access and thereby improve sustainability of marine resources.

This work presents the results of framed field experiments designed to study the co-enforcement of access to common pool resources. The experiments were conducted in the field with artisanal fishers in Chile. In the experiments, members of a CPR group (called insiders) not only decided how much to harvest but also invest in monitoring to deter poaching by outsiders. Sanctions for poaching were exogenous as if provided by a government authority.