This work presents the results of framed field experiments designed to study the co-enforcement of access to common pool resources. The experiments were conducted in the field with artisanal fishers in Chile. In the experiments, members of a CPR group (called insiders) not only decided how much to harvest but also invest in monitoring to deter poaching by outsiders. Sanctions for poaching were exogenous as if provided by a government authority.

In this introduction to the special issue, “Economics of Marine Resources in the Global South,” we address the current challenges for sustainable management of aquaculture and capture fisheries in developing and transitional countries. We note that the collective action problem remains a major challenge for capture fisheries in the Global South. While aquaculture has been a fast-moving food sector for half a century and provides disadvantaged people in the Global South with low-cost, high-quality protein, negative externalities remain an industry-wide challenge.

Chile’s extended allocation of marine user rights aims to reduce overextraction of marine resources. New user rights promote small-scale aquaculture both to increase coastal incomes and to encourage fishers to transition to other livelihoods. Some activities prove profitable only in particular biogeographic settings, such as open ocean or estuaries. We examine a coastal region of Chile to investigate the response of households to these marine-based activities and rights.

Aquaculture has become a key activity for coastal development. Despite of positive impacts on employment, it is questioned by its potential negative effects. This paper analyses the motivations of a rural community in Chile to reject the installation of an aquaculture firm. The results reveal that potential environmental impacts, changes in the way of life and organization of work, tourism reduction, and the demand of specialized labor explain this rejection.

Abstract