This study measured the discount rates of 262 farm households in the Ethiopian highlands, using a time preference experiment with real payoffs. In general, the median discount rate was very high and varied systematically with wealth and risk aversion. Our findings, however, warn that rates-of-time preferences (RTPs) and risk aversion reinforce each other and are easily confused. Because the RTPs were so high, what seem like profitable investments from the outside might not seem so from the farmers’ perspectives.

The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment.

The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that an increase in stake size does neither significantly affect cooperation nor the level of punishment.

Objectives: To estimate household willingness to pay (WTP) for cholera vaccines in a rural area of Bangladesh, which had participated in a 1985 oral cholera vaccine trial. Methods: A contingent valuation study was undertaken in Matlab, Bangladesh in summer 2005. All respondents (N= 591) received a description of a cholera vaccine that was 50% effective for 3 years and had negligible side effects. Respondents were asked how many vaccines they would purchase for their household at randomly pre-assigned prices.

The empirical analysis in this paper shows that production risk plays a significant role in sustainable land-management technology adoption in the Ethiopian highlands.

Analysis of the differences in firms’ responsiveness to PROPER (Indonesia’s successful public disclosure program for industrial pollution control) showed that foreign-owned firms and firms in densely populated areas were more likely to respond to public environmental ratings. Firms with bad environmental performances felt pressure to improve, but this incentive diminished after the initial abatement steps.

This artefactual experiment in Ethiopia tested the hyperbolic discounting hypothesis by comparing time discounting over cash and consumption goods, using real payoffs. It found no difference in elicited time preferences between cash and consumption goods (tradable or final), which could be the result of missing markets in rural Ethiopia, and there was some evidence of time-inconsistent preferences.

Just how important social context is for voluntary contributions is investigated in a natural field experiment, where subjects made either actual or hypothetical contributions to a national park in Costa Rica.

This study found that both anonymity and information about others’ donations influenced contributions, implying that validity testing of stated preference methods needs to include comparisons of hypothetical and actual behavior for given social contexts.

In a natural field experiment, the authors quantified the importance of anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity through the provision of social reference levels in order to explain voluntary contributions. In the study setting, the effects of the various treatments were small, suggesting that the self-image as an honorable person, irrespective of other people’s opinions, could be an important explanation of contribution behavior. The experiment overall showed no clear evidence that current practice by charitable organizations is inefficient.

The revitalization of Machakos, Kenya, from overpopulation and resource degradation—seemingly by its population growth—has added another round to the Boserupian vs. Malthusian debate, and may make Machakos unique.

This study investigated Machakos’ improvement by looking at the role of social capital with principal component analysis and found significant differences between Machakos and two other Kenyan regions, particularly in the formation of associations.

Livelihoods in low-income developing countries are generally undiversified and focus on crop production and animal raising. These activities are inherently risky and investment and production decisions by farm households are therefore made within environments that are affected by risk.