This report forms just one part of an integrated research effort on the BCLME fisheries being carried out by “The Consortium”. It is anticipated that, as the rest of the BCLME projects advance, new information relevant to this study will come to light. This is particularly true for project LMR/SE/03/03, for example. The Consortium wishes to reserve the right to update this marketing report if and when the relevant information becomes available.

This paper analyses participatory development through the lens of public goods theory. South Africa's Community Water Supply & Sanitation Programme is discussed as a case study.

We explore the effect of income inequality and peer punishment on voluntary provision of public goods in an experimental context. Our sample draws from nine fishing communities in South-Africa where high levels of inequality prevail.

A fishery run as a perfect monopoly seeking to maximize its profits over time, and secure in
its monopoly rights, will try to maximize the present value of its economic rents or profits over
time. To do this it will have to exploit the resource sustainably, keeping up the level of the
resource so as to keep up its catch per unit effort, and keep down its costs.

This paper formulates a bioeconomic model to analyze community incentives for wildlife management under benefit-sharing programs like the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe.