What happens if a mechanism that aims at improving coordination between individuals treats selected individuals unfairly? We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether procedural fairness concerns affect how well individuals are able to solve a coordination problem in a two-player Volunteer's Dilemma. Subjects receive external action recommendations that can help them avoid miscoordination if followed by both players.

This paper concerns optimal redistributive non-linear income taxation in an OLG model, where people care about their own consumption relative to (i) other people's current consumption, (ii) own past consumption, and (iii) other people's past consumption. We show that both (i) and (iii) affect the marginal income tax structure whereas (ii) does not. We also derive conditions under which atemporal and intertemporal consumption comparisons give rise to exactly the same tax policy responses.

In this paper we tested if social networks at the origin, measured by religious affiliation, can affect the out-migration decision. For this purpose, we estimated a conditional logit model and a mixed logit model for the decision to migrate to one of 13 destinations, or to stay at the original location. In general, the results were as expected, given theoretical considerations, and were robust to model specification and estimation procedures. Moreover, the results support the hypothesis that religious attachment affects migration decisions.

This paper concerns optimal income taxation under asymmetric information in a two-type overlapping generations model, where people care about their relative consumption compared to others.