In the highlands of Ethiopia, livestock as an important component of the mixed farming system perform multiple functions providing high quality food, draft power and manure for crop production, and cash income. Field studies in different parts of the country in the 1980s showed that livestock account for 37-87% of total farm cash income of farmers, indicating the importance of livestock in rural livelihood, especially as one moves from mixed farming in the highlands to agropastoral systems on the highland-lowland margins (Gryseels, 1988).

This paper analyses participatory development through the lens of public goods theory. South Africa's Community Water Supply & Sanitation Programme is discussed as a case study.

We explore the effect of income inequality and peer punishment on voluntary provision of public goods in an experimental context. Our sample draws from nine fishing communities in South-Africa where high levels of inequality prevail.

The proportion of money sent, which is typically assumed to reflect trust, decreased significantly as the stake
size was increased in a trust game conducted in rural Bangladesh.

Nevertheless, even with very large stakes, most senders and receivers sent substantial fractions.

This paper reports the results of a stated preference survey in the highlands of Ethiopia where the farmers are given a choice between an agricultural extension package and a local public - representing two major developing strategies. The study finds that a majority of people prefers the public good.

Individuals’ preferences for risk and inequality are measured through choices between imagined societies and lotteries.

This paper employs a choice experiment to obtain consumer preferences and willingness to pay for food product quality attributes currently not available in Sweden.

We find, using survey-experimental methods, that most individuals are concerned with both relative income and relative consumption of particular goods. The degree of concern varies in the expected direction depending on the properties of the good.

We investigate the effectiveness of different smoking policies on smokers’ expectations to quit smoking using a choice experiment on a sample of smokers identified within the World Health Organization (WHO) MONICA Project.

This paper presents an experimental study of two different pollution compliance games: collective vis-à-vis random fining as a means to regulate non-point pollution. Result suggests the importance of considering subject pool differences in the evaluation of environmental policies by means of experiments, particularly if those policies involve certain forms of management decisions.