Namibia's fishing industry is managed using a system of fishing rights and individual fishing quotas. This property rights system was intended to encourage the local fishing industry to exploit the resource responsibly. Unfortunately, unintended perverse incentives have promoted induced overcapacity and inefficient use of vessels. In combination with inconsistent quota allocations, the result has been persistent pressure on the already depleted biological resource. This paper uses a bio-economic model to estimate actual and potential profits in Namibia's hake fishery.

The hake (Merluccius capensis and M. paradoxus) directed offshore demersal trawl is the most economically important fishing sector in South Africa, generating 30,000 jobs and comprising more than 50% of fisheries value. The industry changed to long term rights (LTRA), allocated in 2006 for a 15 year period. This study investigates the structure of the industry half-way between allocations.