Fisheries have a long tradition of implementing sustainable practices. In aquaculture, the concept of sustainable practices is more recent and there is therefore a need for methodologies to evaluate…
Manuel Estay, EfD Chile researcher, University of Concepción, and his colleagues Thomas Eisenberg, University of Delaware, and Debi Prasad Mohapatra, University of Massachusetts - Amherst, were…
Two researchers from NENRE EfD-Chile have been awarded research funds from the Scientific and Technological Development Fund (FONDECYT). These awards, given in a highly competitive national context…
The Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture Development, Ghana has formally announced the use of electronic monitoring systems or videos on industrial vessels as part of measures to control illegal…
We present the results of framed field (lab-in-field) experiments designed to investigate the endogenous formation of common pool resource (CPR) coalitions when the resource is co-defended with costly monitoring by coalition members and sanctions for encroachment imposed by the government. The experiments were conducted with fishers who were members of Chile's territorial use rights fisheries (TURFs) and in the lab with Chilean university students. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the fishers frequently formed CPR coalitions, even when they could not deter outsider poaching.
Overfishing or the misuse of open marine resources can cause them to collapse. To cope with this problem, many governments restrict access to fishing grounds. However, corrupt practices hamper the…
Abandoned, lost, and discarded fishing gear (ALDFG) is claimed to be a global problem with impacts on marine animals and ecosystems, posing considerable ecological and socioeconomic challenges. Nonetheless, insufficient understanding regarding how marine ecosystem services are affected by ALDFG creates a knowledge gap that challenges a holistic estimation of the long-term economic impacts of using non-degradable fishing gear.
The aim of this study is to explore theoretically the circumstances in which collusion can emerge between artisanal organizations and external agents. We also analyze theoretically how collusion can alter the sustainability equilibria of marine resources. In situations of incomplete information where external agents are not aware of the initial stock of resources, we observe how those agents decide whether to accept or reject offers of collusion from artisanal organizations.
In low-income food-deficit coastal countries, fish forms a critical source of animal protein. Yet, capture fisheries, which provide fish protein to the local populations, are typically overcapitalized and exhibit classical signs of biological overfishing, threatening the livelihoods of communities. With the high and increasing fishing pressure, the rate of stock depletion may continue to intensify, thereby tilting households’ preferences towards consumption of other types of animal protein depending on whether (or not) they have strong preferences for those types of protein.