Land conflicts can be detrimental. An important goal of development policy is to help define and instill respect for borders. This is often implemented through mandatory and expensive interventions that rely on the expansion of government land administration institutions.

The paper provides and tests empirically a conditional resource curse theory, postulating that the relative effectiveness of the contenders plays a crucial role in determining whether resources are a curse or a blessing.

This paper examines the implications for Egypt and Sudan of the development of Blue Nile water resources by Ethiopia. The long-term development program produced between 1958 and 1963 by the Ethiopian government in collaboration with the US Bureau of Reclamation is summarized.

A linear programming model is used to examine the
effects on Egypt and Sudan of implementing this program. It is found
that water for agricultural use in Egypt and Sudan would actually
increase, though there would be some adverse consequences for Egypt.

Nation-states rarely go to war over water, but it is equally rare that water conflicts in an international river basin are resolved through cooperation among the riparian countries that use the shared resources. Gains from cooperation will mean little to individual riparians unless the required cooperative behaviors are incentive compatible.