To Bribe or Not to Bribe: Incentives to Protect Tanzania´s Forest

EfD Discussion Paper
1 January 2009

In forests managed by participatory management in Tanzania, “volunteer” patrollers often enforce access restrictions, receiving a share of collected fine revenue as incentive. The authors explore how shared revenue and alternative sources of forest products for villagers determine the patrollers’ enforcement effort and decision to take bribes rather than report violators.

Using an optimal enforcement model, they show that without transparency or funds to pay and monitor these patrollers, policymakers face tradeoffs among efficiency, enforcement effectiveness, and revenue collection.



Files and links

Sustainable Development Goals

Request a publication

Due to Copyright we cannot publish this article but you are very welcome to request a copy from the author. Please just fill in the information beneath.

Authors I want to contact
Publication | 21 September 2009