AbstractMuch of the debate between the European and US positions about the labeling of genetically modified (GM) foods has been whether consumers perceive labels as a source of information or as a signal to change behavior. In this paper we provide an experimental framework for examining these roles of information and signaling. While previous studies have focused on the impact of labels on consumer behavior, our interest is also in what happens prior to the expression of aversion to GM-labeled foods.

This article begins by tracing the development of the Indian model of food distribution. Food subsidies in India are delivered through the public distribution system, consisting of a network of retail outlets through which the government sells grain. The discussions then turn to the outcomes and the performance of the distribution system, food security legislation, the rights approach to food security, debates over food security legislation, lessons from social assistance programs across the world, and political opposition to cash transfers.

India’s food policy is in a state of flux. This is a rare moment. Food policies and their governance have enjoyed stability and continuity for many decades. Indeed, the framework for these policies was set by the war-time interventions of the colonial government in India. Those interventions consisting of direct procurement of grain and rationed distribution had the object of securing food supplies for urban populations. Even though the objectives of food policy have mutated over the years, the interventions have not materially changed form despite changes in scale.

Utilizing the data I collected on a nationally mandated school meal program in India, I examine the extent to which children benefit from the targeted public transfer. Relying upon built-in randomness in whether a child's 24-hour food consumption recall was for a school or non-school day, I find that the daily nutrient intake of program participants increased substantially by 49% to 100% of the transfers. The results are robust to the potential endogeneity of program placement and individual participation.