This paper investigates the relation between risk taking and market power in the US banking sector by introducing the effect of geographical spillovers caused by the transmission of risk taking among banks. For this purpose, we use spatial econometrics. Our results support a negative relation between risk taking and market power. The transmission of risk taking causes significant geographical spillovers, which increases the magnitude of the relation under analysis here.

This research estimates an ordered probit model with data from the 2014 LAPOP survey to explore the factors that explain confidence in institutions in Chile. Results show an increased lack of confidence from the original peoples toward security institutions, probably due to the Mapuche Conflict. There is also a positive effect of democracy and performance variables that unveils differences in responsibilities between the executive power and the municipalities.

In this paper, the empirical analysis finds that the dynamics of inflation and unemployment can be described by a Phillips curve when allowing for a positive co-movement between trend-adjusted productivity and unemployment. This suggests that improvements in productivity have been achieved by laying off the least productive part of the labor force. Furthermore, the natural rate of unemployment is a function of the long-term interest rate, indicating that monetary policy is not completely neutral in the long run.

This article examines the collective bargaining efforts of atomized fishermen with a monopsony-like buying sector. Government allocation of collective share quotas to fishermen’s organizations triggered the voluntary formation of cooperative fishermen’s bargaining associations, while a highly concentrated processing sector started behaving as a countervailing monopsony. This drove ex-vessel price determination into region-specific bilateral monopoly price bargaining.

Ocean acidification (OA) is one of the largest emerging and significant environmental threats for the aquaculture industry, jeopardizing its role as an alternative for supporting food security. Moreover, market conditions, characterized by price volatility and low value-added products, could exacerbate the industry's vulnerability to OA.

We perform a cost–benefit analysis on the introduction of monetary incentives for living kidney donations by estimating the compensation that would make an individual indifferent between donating and not donating a kidney while alive using Chilean data. We find that monetary incentives of US$12,000 save US$38,000 to health care system per donor and up to US$169,871 when we consider the gains in quality of life of receiving an organ. As one allows the incentives to vary depending on the individual position on the wage distribution, the compensation ranges from US$4214 to US$83,953.