An optimal first-best road charge should not only be differentiated with respect to factors that affect the direct external environmental and time costs from the road-user himself.
Indirect effects, such as the fact that others’ cars will be more polluting when congestion increases, should also be taken into account.
Many argue that it is socially inefficient to use distributional weights in cost-benefit analysis, and that doing so implies large inefficiency losses, when distributional matters can be dealt with through income taxation, instead.
We find, using survey-experimental methods, that most individuals are concerned with both relative income and relative consumption of particular goods. The degree of concern varies in the expected direction depending on the properties of the good.
This paper provides an overview and a discussion of environmental taxes in Europe. On the whole, most European countries have fairly high levels of environmental taxation – at least compared to the US.
Over the last two decades many airline markets have been deregulated, resulting in increased competition and use of different types of networks. At the same time there has been an intense discussion on environmental taxation of airline traffic. It is likely that an optimal environmental tax and the effects of a tax differ between different types of aviation markets.
As part of a natural resource accounting project being undertaken in Namibia, energy accounts have been compiled and are used to analyse energy use by different economic sectors. Households account for most energy use, especially of traditional fuels, and many households continue to rely on rewood even when they have access to electricity.
In this paper, we address the issue of optimal environmental taxation under imperfect competition. The problem is analysed for three different types of duopoly models, the Cournot open and closed loop models, and the Stackelberg model.