Espinoza, Sophia, Carlos Chávez Rebolledo and Jorge Dresdner Cid. 2013. “Opciones de política para reducir la cacería ilegal: Una aplicación al caso de la Reserva de Vida Silvestre Amazónica Manuripi, Bolivia.” Ecosistemas 22:2: 97-103.
Download reference Doi:10.7818/ECOS.2013.22-2.14
Illegal hunting is a threat to wildlife conservation. The motivations for poaching and its possible effects are variable and have not been extensively studied. Applying an economic theoretical-conceptual frame, we analyze the different factors that may determine illegal hunting and discuss some policy implications.
Based on the illegal hunting experience during the Brazil nut harvesting season in the Manuripi Amazon Wildlife Reserve, Bolivia, we analyzed an extensive study of non-compliance. By reviewing primary and secondary sources of information and the deterrent economic models theory, we identified that the probability of detection and sanction, morality, legitimacy and social influence may affect compliance with the hunting prohibition in the Manuripi Reserve. Additionally, we consider that knowledge of the regulation may also affect the decision to hunt. Finally, we found empirical evidence suggesting that habits of eating wild meat among collectors and non-wild meat availability are factors that affect the decision to hunt illegally in the Manuripi Reserve. Based on our analysis, the recommendations to reduce illegal hunting during the Brazil nut harvesting period focus on strengthening the enforcement, monitoring and control efforts by the Environmental Authority, in addition to awareness processes that can change the ethical values and cultural habits among collectors.