Wolfgang is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Economics and funded by Formas COMMONS.
Alan Krupnick is a senior fellow at Resources for the Future.
Juha Siikamäki's research focuses on evaluating the benefits, costs, and cost-effectiveness of different environmental policy options.
Efthymia Kyriakopoulou is a Research Fellow at the Environmental Economics Unit, University of Gothenburg and Visiting Researcher at the Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, Roy
Elinor Ostrom was Distinguished Professor, Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science, and Senior Research Director of theWorkshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington; and Founding Director, Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, Arizona State University.
Michael Cox is a Postdoc at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University.
Katarina Nordblom is an associate professor and currently the Head of Department at the Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg.
Maria Damon is an Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies at New York University.
Anna Nordén is a research fellow at the Environmental Economics Unit, Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, and at the Department of Physical Geography and Ecosystem Science, Lund Univ
Elina Lampi is an associate professor at the Environmental Economics Unit, Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg.
Jessica Coria is an associate professor at the Department of Economics at the University of Gothenburg.
Olof Johansson-Stenman's current research interest is largely about behavioral, environmental and public economics, and about exploring deviations from the purely selfish, rational and atomist
Carolyn Fischer is a senior fellow at Resources for the Future and currently a Marie Skłodowska–Curie Fellow of the European Commission, visiting at the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) in Venic
Åsa Löfgren is Associate Professor and Assistant Head of Department at the Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg.
Peter Martinsson is a professor in behavioural economics at the Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg.
Jesper Stage was Research Officer for the EfD initiative from January 2007 until July 2008.
Håkan Eggert is Associate professor at the Department of Economics and Chairman of the undergraduate environmental social science program and of the masters program in environmental management and
Fredrik Carlsson is a professor of economics at the Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg.
Allen coordinates Resources for the Future's participation in EfD. His research has focused principally on tropical deforestation and industrial pollution in Latin America and Asia.
Thomas Sterner is a professor of environmental economics in Gothenburg and a university fellow at RFF, in 2012-2013 he was on sabbatical leave from Gothenburg and worked as Chief Economist at
Gunnar Köhlin is an associate professor at the Environmental Economics Unit, Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg. As co-founder of the EEU he has now spent 20 years working with applications of environmental economics in developing countries. He is currently director of the Environment for Development initiative.
EfD in Ethiopia will be represented in the 27th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists (IAAE). Dr Zenebe Gebreegziabher will be presenting a paper entitled "Institutions and Sustainable Land Use: the Case of Forest and Grazing Lands in Northern Ethiopia" at the conference. The theme of the conference is "The Global Landscape of Agriculture".
The objectives of this field study are: (1) to implement a set of experiments to investigate the effect of the one-child policy on; (2) to collect data of peoples’ back-ground and in particular if they were born right before or right after the policy was implemented. By implementing this experiment, it is possible to estimate the effect of the policy in a set of preferences such as cooperativeness, risk attitudes and time consistency.
This project about the congestion charge in Beijing is in three parts. Each part will look at different aspects of the congestion charge, one is on valuation of travel time, the other will analyse the effects of the congestion charge policy on different commuting modes and the experiment is on hypothetical bias and individuals stated preferences in transportation studies.
We will to conduct a large study about different interest groups´ preferences for improving situation for coastal cod stocks in Western Sweden. The different interest groups included in our study are policy makers, commercial fishers, recreational anglers, and common citizens.
This project is an attempt to better understand the effects of social networks on the diffusion and adoption of new technologies. In particular, we investigate if having friends or relative that had a chance to experience solar lanterns for their personal use increases an individual's willingness to pay for a solar lantern.
In Kenya we are carrying out a series of water related projects. In one project we study the Nairobi Water Company that is considering a water tariff reform. Another study is on rural water source choice and the main objective of this research is to generate information that can inform the evolution of improved water management policies in Kenya.
The project addresses the impact of climate change on the value of wildlife and welfare of ranchers. We use a panel Ricardian model to address specification challenges of single year cross sectional survey and unstable results due to repeated cross sectional surveys.
Our focus in this project is on the interactions between multiple eco-services programs, e.g., between: two offsets programs aimed to lower costs for different eco-services; two payments programs to increase different eco-services; or one offsets program and one payments program that are each targeting a different eco-service.
This research project will study if and how procedural fairness concerns affect coordination such as in the provision on threshold public goods. The provision of such goods can be modeled as a coordination game with several, non-pareto-rankable equilibria. Without any additional mechanisms, coordination on an efficient equilibrium has proven to be difficult: Who should contribute, and how much? For example, in the case where the contribution of one individual is enough to provide the public good: Who should be the volunteer?
In this project, we implement carefully designed field experiments in urban Tanzania to investigate if poor households do overweigh low-probability events. We also investigate time preference behaviors of the same subjects.
In this project, our research question is: What is the level of dishonesty in an anonymous natural field experiment and are norms activated that reduces the level of dishonesty from any of the two treatments? We conduct a natural field experiment and the subjects are Tanzanian farmers that were interviewed on farming activities and socio-economic conditions and participated in risk and time preference experiments.
This project contributes to an effort to develop such a common framework, or meta-theoretical language, which can be used by scholars in a consistent fashion to facilitate such comparisons and subsequent generalization and theory-building.
This project is designed to build on previous synthetic work at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. It involves a group of 14 scholars collaborating to conduct a meta-analysis of cases of large-scale environmental governance to examine whether common-pool resource theories can help to explain outcomes at large scales.
The aim of this project is twofold. First, by testing the theory of strategic ignorance in real purchase decisions, we analyze whether the existing lab results are transferable to everyday decisions of consumers. Second, if evidence is found in favor of strategic ignorance, it can have important implications for environmental policy because it sheds light on the efficiency of information provision to consumers by using for example eco- labels and certifications.
Gender, labour and forest management in Burkina Faso: Understanding gendered impacts of REDD+ interventions
This project will analyze the gender differentiated effects (time allocation, resource access, income) of a large-scale REDD+ intervention in Burkina Faso and also feeding into the REDD+ policy process.
The project includes two studies. One project is on possible differences in subjective and objective risks in four different zones with different malaria exposure, and whether a person´s subjective risk can explain his/her use of bed nets. The other is on the problem of resistance in malaria medication.
Beijing has notoriously severe air pollution and traffic congestion problems. Like many mega-cities in developing countries, it seeks to mitigate these problems by restricting vehicles from being driven one day per week based on the last digit of their license plate. Our project will use the contingent valuation method to estimate the cost this policy imposes on drivers.
Applying the social-ecological system framework to the diagnosis of urban lake commons in Bangalore, India
Abstract: The south Indian city of Bangalore provides a challenging yet representative context within which to examine issues of governance of urban social-ecological commons. The city was once famous for its numerous large water bodies, which have witnessed tremendous encroachment and pollution in recent years. These water bodies, called tanks or lakes, were typically managed by adjacent village communities but are now administered by a number of government departments involved with aspects of lake management, with multiple overlapping jurisdictions.
Abstract: Human-induced causes of forest change occur at multiple scales. Yet, most governance mechanisms are designed at a single level – whether international, national, regional or local – and do not provide effective solutions for the overarching challenge of forest governance.
Abstract: During the last 50 years, at least four interdisciplinary developments have occurred at the boundaries of political science and economics that have affected the central ques- tions that both political scientists and economists ask, the empirical evidence amassed as a new foundation for understanding political economies, and new questions for fu- ture research. These include: (1) the Public Choice Approach, (2) the Governance of the Commons debate, (3) New Institutional Economics, and (4) Behavioral Approaches to Ex- plaining Human Actions.
Individual status quo modelling for a rural water service in Rwanda: application of a choice experiment
Abstract: In Rwanda, rural water supply is not uniformly distributed. Rural areas are characterized by differences in the distance to the nearest water point and in water quality for domestic water, by watering frequency and water availability for irrigation water, and by the price for both. A household's perception of further improvements in water supply will, therefore, depend heavily on the situation it currently faces. The authors used a choice experiment to model how the individual status quo (SQ) affects preferences.
Abstract: This paper demonstrates that unintended effects of climate policies (Green Paradox effects) also arise in general equilibrium when countries compete for mobile factors of production (capital and resources/energy). Second, it shows that countries have a rationale to use strictly positive source-based capital taxes to slow down resource extraction. Notably, this result comes about in the absence of any revenue requirements by the government, and independently of the elasticity of substitution between capital and resources in production.
Is Eco-Certification a Win–Win for Developing Country Agriculture? Organic Coffee Certification in Colombia
Abstract: According to advocates, eco-certification is a win–win solution to the problem of environmental degradation caused by developing country agriculture, improving both the environmental and the economic performance of farmers. However, these notional benefits can be undercut by the tendency of relatively wealthy farmers already meeting eco-certification standards to disproportionately participate.
Abstract: In this paper, we acknowledge that the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change have differential fiscal impacts. Whereas mitigation typically raises fiscal revenues, adaptation is costly to the taxpayer and to a greater extent the more distortionary the tax system is. In an OLG model with majority voting, we analyze how the choices of mitigation and adaptation are distorted under a lump-sum and a distortionary income tax regime.
Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Geography.
Abstract: Reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from power plants can have important "co-benefits" for public health by reducing emissions of air pollutants. Here, we examine the costs and health co-benefits, in monetary terms, for a policy that resembles the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Clean Power Plan. We then examine the spatial distribution of the co-benefits and costs, and the implications of a range of cost assumptions in the implementation year of 2020.
Abstract: In this paper, we examine the relative influence of individual decisions on joint household decisions, and whether and to what extent joint choices are more or less patient than individual choices in households. We find that both spouses have a significant influence on joint decisions, whereas husbands on average have a stronger influence than wives. Moreover, we find a substantial share of choice shifts from individual to joint household decisions, i.e. joint decisions are either more patient or more impatient than both individual choices.
Abstract: We analyze a typical principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy, in which the principals of two countries first decide whether to merge their domestic emission permit markets to form an international market. In the second stage, they delegate the decision on domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals have an incentive to select agents who care less for environmental damages than they do themselves.