Research Proposal: Improving energy efficiency in Costa Rican households: the effect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives in shaping the timing of consumption
EfD researchers: Milagro Saborio
Collaborators: Anthony Kwasnica and James Shortle, Penn State University
Abstract: In an application of Banks and Dugan (2000)´ bargaining game to a water pollution setting, Saborio-Rodriguez, Kwasnica and Shortle (2013) found that bargaining, with unanimity rule and positive time discounting, leads to a social optimum internalization of the externality.
The purpose of the project “Experiments to test a bargaining game for reducing pollution” is to test the bargaining game using experiments in a laboratory. The externality affects players asymmetrically, because of their location along a river. Pay offs are related to a pollution decision and monetary transfers, if an agreement is reached. In this seminar, main advances of the experimental design are presented with the aim of receiving feedback before pilot testing and data collection.