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Payment for ecosystem services


Combining state of the art science with practitioner´s wisdom in the design of PES schemes: Lessons from the Costa Rican experience

Our goal is to learn about the Costa Rican experience from the inside, working closely with FONAFIFO staff to understand how they have sought to improve efficiency and to explore  options for setting payment levels and targeting to increase efficiency, without missing the myriad of norms, rules, and other obstacles that program managers might face in the implementation of, for example, procurement auctions. 


Welfare Implications of the Payment for Environmental Services: Case of Uluguru Mountain –Morogoro

This study was carried to find out the impact of PES (Payment for Environmental Services) on the welfare of the communities in the Uluguru Mountains. The aim of the study is to assess the main objectives of the PES project which is to conserve the environment (forest) and reduce poverty. The assessment of the project is done by looking on the difference between the treatment group (those who participate in PES) and control group (households who do not participate).


Payment Types and Participation in Payment for Ecosystem Services Programs: Stated Preferences of Landowners

Because the effectiveness of payment for ecosystem services (PES) programs depends on landowners’ engagement, understanding the relationship between the type of payment and participation is a key issue. This paper reports on a choice experiment that quantifies landowners’ preferences for cash and educational in-kind payment. The main results indicate a positive correlation between participation in a PES contract and the magnitude of the cash payment, while participation seems uncorrelated with the magnitude of the educational in-kind payment.


Labor as a Utility Measure in Contingent Valuation: Application to the Valuation of Restoration Projects in Latin America

Monetary contributions might not be an appropriate welfare measure in Contingent Valuation (CV) when household incomes are very low. In such cases, willingness to pay (WTP) is restricted by household's ability to reduce the consumption of other goods in order to pay for the environmental good under valuation. Beneficiaries, however, may be willing to contribute their time to work on the project instead of paying money.


Effects of Exclusion from a Conservation Policy: Negative Behavioral Spillovers from Targeted Incentives

A critical issue in the design of incentive mechanisms is the choice of whom to target. For forests, the leading schemes: [i] target locations with high ecosystem-service density; [ii] target additionality, i.e., locations where conservation would not occur without the incentive; or, at least effectively, [iii] reward previous private choices to conserve forest. We use a field experiment to examine the changes in contributions to forest conservation when we introduce each of those three selection rules.