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Enforcement

2014-03-01

Field Experiments on Cooperative Management of Local Common Resources

This project will use the tools of experimental economics to study behavioral issues related to both the protection of a common-pool resource from poaching by outsiders, and the enforcement of rules and norms to maintain compliance within a group.  The experiments are motivated by the Chilean abalone (loco) fishery and will be conducted in the field with members of local artisanal fishing

2009-03-01

Who should pay the enforcement costs of environmental and natural resource management policies?

Implementation and management of an ITQ fishery involves significant and costly administrative activities.  These activities include formulating and implementing policy rules, monitoring and enforcement to deter illegal behavior, and economic and marine research.  In this project we construct a model of a competitive ITQ system to analyze how the distribution of administrative costs b

2018-07-28

Managing and Defending the Commons: Experimental Evidence from TURFs in Chile

This work presents the results of framed field experiments designed to study the joint problem of managing harvests from a common pool resource and protecting the resource from poaching. The experiments were conducted both in the field with TURF users and in the lab with university students. Our study has two objectives. First, we designed our experiments to study the effects of poaching on the ability of common pool resource users to coordinate their harvests when encroachment by outsiders is unrestricted and when the government provides weak enforcement.

2016-03-31

The regulatory choice of noncompliance in the lab: effect on quantities, prices, and implications for the design of a cost-effective policy

Recent theoretical developments show the conditions under which it is cost effective for the regulator to induce perfect compliance in cap and trade programs. These conditions are based on the ability that a regulator with perfect information has to induce the firms to emit any desired level with different combinations of the number of permits supplied to the market and the monitoring probability, assuming that firms are expected profits maximizers. In this paper we test this hypothesis with a series of laboratory experiments.

2015-10-26

Compliance in Artisanal Fisheries: Do Morality, Legitimacy, and Peer Effects Matter?

We study the compliance behavior of artisanal fishermen in central-southern Chile. Our empirical analysis explores the role of individual morality, perception of legitimacy, and peer effects as determinant factors in the decision to violate regulations. We control for potential simultaneity bias in the peer effects variable. Our results find evidence that moral standing, peer effects, and legitimacy considerations are important for fishermen’s compliance decisions. Policy implications to improve compliance with regulations in artisanal fisheries are discussed.

2015-03-09

Using Taxes to Deter Illegal Fishing in ITQ Systems

We study the effects of different tax schemes used in fisheries management in combination with an individual transferable quota system. We focus on the effects of taxes on equilibrium quota prices and on violations under the assumption that enforcement to induce compliance is imperfect and costly.

2015-01-25

Using Taxes to Deter Illegal Fishing in ITQ Systems

This paper studies the effects of different tax schemes used in fishery management in combination with an Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system. It focuses on the effects of taxes on equilibrium quota prices and violations under the assumption that enforcement to induce compliance is imperfect and costly. The use of taxes is motivated by the regulator’s need to recover costs for enforcement activities.

2014-03-01

Field Experiments on Cooperative Management of Local Common Resources

This project will use the tools of experimental economics to study behavioral issues related to both the protection of a common-pool resource from poaching by outsiders, and the enforcement of rules and norms to maintain compliance within a group.  The experiments are motivated by the Chilean abalone (loco) fishery and will be conducted in the field with members of local artisanal fishing organizations.

2013-09-14

Who Should Pay the Administrative Costs of an ITQ Fishery

Implementation and management of an ITQ fishery involves significant and costly administrative activities. These activities include formulating and implementing policy rules, monitoring and enforcement to deter illegal behavior, and economic and marine research. In this article we construct a model of a competitive ITQ system to analyze how the distribution of administrative costs between the public and a fishing industry can affect the equilibrium in the quota market, including equilibrium level of administrative costs, and derive results about the optimal distribution of these costs.

2013-08-06

Who Should Bear the Administrative Costs of an Emissions Tax

All environmental policies involve costs of implementation and management that are distinct from pollution sources’ abatement costs. In practice, regulators and sources usually share these administrative costs. We examine theoretically an optimal policy consisting of an emissions tax and the distribution of administrative costs between the government and regulated sources of pollution. Our focus is on the optimal distribution of administrative costs between polluters and the government and the optimal level of the emissions tax in relation to marginal pollution damage.

2012-03-04

Estándares vs. Sistemas de Permisos Transables con Costos de Fiscalización: Una aplicación al caso de fuentes fijas en Bogotá, Colombia

We study the cost effectiveness property of different control strategies for improving environmental quality. Our prospective analysis considers the application of Transferable Emissions Permit System (TEPS), Transferable Ambient Permit System (TAPS) and Standards (STD) applied on fix sources in Bogota-Colombia. A numerical simulation model allowed us to obtain costs of each regulatory system, which were compared with associated urban environmental quality. The results show that the most cost effective regulation for any environmental quality goal is TEPS, followed by TAPS and finally STD.

2011-12-24

The Cost-Effective Choice of Policy Instruments to Cap Aggregate Emissions with Costly Enforcement

We study the cost-effectiveness of inducing compliance in a program that caps aggregate emissions of a given pollutant from a set of heterogeneous firms based on emissions standards and the relative cost-effectiveness of such a program with respect to an optimally designed program based on tradable discharge permits. Our analysis considers abatement, monitoring and sanctioning costs, as well as perfect and imperfect information on the part of the regulator with regard to the polluters’ abatement costs.

2010-12-04

Determinantes de Cumplimiento en el Programa de Tasas Restributivas de Colombia. El Caso de Corpochivor

We evaluate the factors that influence the reported level of pollution and those referred to the compliance with the payment of discharge fees from sources regulated under the Colombia’s Discharge Fee Program. The analysis uses a data set that contains information at plant level and considers individual sources operating under the jurisdiction of the Regional Autonomous Corporation of the Chivor (Corpochivor), for period 2001-2006.

2010-06-09

On the interaction between imperfect compliance and technology adoption: taxes versus tradable emissions permits

This paper analyzes the effects of the interaction between technology adoption and incomplete enforcement on the extent of violations and the rate of abatement technology adoption. We focus on price-based and quantity-based emission regulations. First, we show that in contrast to uniform taxes, under tradable emissions permits (TEPs), the fall in permit price produced by technology adoption reduces the benefits of violating the environmental regulation at the margin and leads firms to modify their compliance behavior.

2010-01-23

Small but Effective Moves towards A Greener China

Ten years ago, there was hardly any environmental enforcement by civil society or by the markets in China. In 1999–2000, the World Bank collaborated on a pilot programme with the Chinese Academy of Environmental Planning, Nanjing University, the Zhenjiang Environmental Protection Bureau in Jiangsu Province and the Hohhot Academy of Environmental Sciences in Inner Mongolia.

2010-01-13

Protecting Developing Countries' Forests: Enforcement in Theory and Practice

This paper relates the key findings of the optimal economic enforcement literature to practical issues of enforcing forest and wildlife management access restrictions in developing countries. Our experiences, particularly from Tanzania and eastern India, provide detail of the key pragmatic issues facing those responsible for protecting natural resources.

2009-08-11

Small but Effective Moves towards A Greener China

Ten years ago, there was hardly any environmental enforcement by civil society or by the markets in China. In 1999–2000, the World Bank collaborated on a pilot programme with the Chinese Academy of Environmental Planning, Nanjing University, the Zhenjiang Environmental Protection Bureau in Jiangsu Province and the Hohhot Academy of Environmental Sciences in Inner Mongolia.

2009-03-01

Who should pay the enforcement costs of environmental and natural resource management policies?)

Implementation and management of an ITQ fishery involves significant and costly administrative activities.  These activities include formulating and implementing policy rules, monitoring and enforcement to deter illegal behavior, and economic and marine research.  In this project we construct a model of a competitive ITQ system to analyze how the distribution of administrative costs between the public and a fishing industry can affect the equilibrium in the quota market, including equilibrium level of administrative costs, and derive results about the optimal distribution of these